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Abstract 
When security of a given network architecture is not properly designed from the 
beginning, it is difficult to preserve confidentiality, authenticity, integrity and non-
repudiation in practical networks. Unlike traditional mobile wireless networks, ad hoc 
networks rely on individual nodes to keep all the necessary interconnections alive. In 
this article we investigate the principal security issues for protecting mobile ad hoc 
networks at the data link and network layers. The security requirements for these two 
layers are identified and the design criteria for creating secure ad hoc networks using 
multiple lines of defense against malicious attacks are discussed.   
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1. Introduction 
Unlike networks using dedicated nodes to support basic functions like packet 
forwarding, routing, and network management, in ad hoc networks these functions are 
carried out by all available nodes. Nodes communicate with each other using wireless 
radios and operate by following a peer-to-peer network model. Such networks are also 
referred to as mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) [7].  
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(a)                                                                                                        (b) 
Figure 1 - Topology changes in MANET 
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A simple MANET example is illustrated in Figure 1. Here it is shown how mobility in 
ad hoc networks causes changes in the network topology. Initially, the network has the 
topology shown in Figure 1 (a) but when node D moves out of the radio range of node 
B, the network topology changes to the one in Figure 1 (b). When node D moves out of 
node B’s radio range, link is broken. Nevertheless, the network remains connected since 
node B can reach node D though nodes C, E, and F. 
 
So far, applications of mobile ad hoc networks have been visualised mainly for crisis 
solutions (e.g., in the battlefield or in rescue operations). In these applications, all the 
nodes of the network belong to a single authority (e.g. a single military unit or a rescue 
team). With the progress of technology, however, it is becoming possible to deploy 
MANET for civilian applications as well [4, 5, 24]. Examples include networks of cars 
and provision of communication facilities in remote areas. In these networks, the nodes 
do not necessarily belong to a single authority. In addition, these networks could be 
larger, have a longer lifetime, and they could be completely self-organizing, meaning 
that the network could be run solely by the operation of the end-users.  
 
Since ad hoc networks can be deployed rapidly, sensitive applications raise important 
security issues. Security requirements in ad hoc networks are different from those of 
fixed networks. While the security requirements are the common ones, namely 
availability, confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation, they are 
considered differently for ad hoc networks due to system constraints in mobile devices 
(i.e. low power microprocessor, small memory and bandwidth, short battery life) and 
frequent network topology changes. 
 
In this article, we focus on the key attributes related to the security of ad hoc networks. 
We seek to identify the security issues and attacks in such networks and also examine 
secure protocols found in the data link and network layers. We also propose a layered 
security design that uses multiple lines of defence against malicious attacks and other 
network faults. In particular, section 2 mentions the security goals and types of attacks 
that exist in ad hoc networks. Sections 3 and 4 present the security aspects of link and 
network layer security protocols and their challenges to secure MANET. Section 5 
describes the layered security design and discusses how challenge-response and zero 
knowledge cryptographic protocols can be applied. Finally, section 6 concludes with 
comments on the unexplored security areas for MANET.  
 
2. Securing ad hoc networks 
Security in ad hoc networks is difficult to be achieved due to their nature. The 
vulnerability of the links, the limited physical protection of each of the nodes, the 
sporadic nature of connectivity, the dynamically changing topology, the absence of a 
certification authority and the lack of a centralized monitoring or management point 
make security goals difficult to achieve [7]. In order to identify critical security points in 
ad hoc networks, it is necessary to examine the security requirements and the types of 
attacks from the ad hoc network perspective.  
 
2.1 .  Security Requirements 
Security requirements depend very much on the kind of application the mobile ad hoc 
network is to be used and the environment in which it has to operate. For example, a 
military MANET will have very stringent requirements in terms of confidentiality and 
resistance to the denial of service attacks (DoS). Similar to other practical networks, 
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MANET security goals include availability, authenticity, integrity, confidentiality and 
non-repudiation.  
 
Availability can be considered as the key value attribute related to the security of 
networks. It ensures that the service offered by the node will be available to its users 
when expected and also guarantees the survivability of network devices despite DoS 
attacks [4, 5, 24]. Possible attacks include adversaries who employ jamming to interfere 
with communication on physical channels, disrupt the routing protocol, disconnect the 
network and bring down high-level services [3, 10, 13]. 
 
Authentication ensures that the communicating parties are the ones claim to be and that 
the source of information is assured [1, 4, 5, 24]. Without authentication, an adversary 
could gain unauthorized access to resources and to sensitive information and possibly 
interfere with the operation of other nodes [9, 11, 14, 21]. 
 
Integrity ensures that no one can tamper with the transferred content [1, 4, 5, 24]. The 
communicating nodes want to be sure that the information comes from an authenticated 
node and not from a node that has been compromised and send out incorrect data. For 
example, message corruption because of radio propagation impairment or because of 
malicious attacks should be avoided.  
 
Confidentiality ensures the protection of sensitive data so that no one can see the 
transferred contents [1, 4, 5, 24]. Leakage of sensitive information, such as in military 
environment, could have devastating consequences. However, it is pointless to attempt 
to protect the secrecy of a communication without first ensuring that one is talking to 
the right node.  
 
Non-repudiation ensures that the communicating parties cannot deny their actions [1, 4, 
5, 24]. It is useful for the detection and isolation of malicious nodes. When node A 
receives an erroneous message from node B, non-repudiation allows node A to accuse 
node B using this message and to convince other nodes that node B has been 
compromised. 
 
2.2 .  Types of Attacks 
Similar to other wireless networks, ad hoc networks are susceptible to passive and 
active attacks [1, 4, 5, 24]. Passive attacks typically involve only eavesdropping of data, 
whereas active attacks involve actions performed by adversaries such as replication, 
modification and deletion of exchanged data. In particular, attacks in ad hoc networks 
can target to cause congestion, propagate incorrect routing information, prevent services 
from working properly or shut them down completely [12, 14, 26].  
 
Nodes that perform active attacks with the aim of damaging other nodes by causing 
network outage are considered to be malicious, also referred to as compromised, while 
nodes that perform passive attacks with the aim of saving battery life for their own 
communications are considered to be selfish [9, 12]. A selfish node affects the normal 
operation of the network by not participating in the routing protocols or by not 
forwarding packets as in the so called black hole attack [18, 25]. 
 
Compromised nodes can interrupt the correct functioning of a routing protocol by 
modifying routing information, by fabricating false routing information and by 
impersonating other nodes. Recent research studies have also brought up a new type of 
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attack that goes under the name of wormhole attack [19, 20, 25, 27]. In the latter, two 
compromised nodes create a tunnel (or wormhole) that is linked through a private 
connection and thus by-pass the network. This allows a node to short-circuit the normal 
flow of routing messages creating a virtual vertex cut in the network that is controlled 
by the two attackers [10].  
 
On the other hand, selfish nodes can severely degrade network performance and 
eventually partition the network by simply not participating in the network operation. 
Compromised nodes can easily perform integrity attacks by altering protocol fields in 
order to subvert traffic, denying communication to legitimate nodes and compromising 
the integrity of routing computations in general. Spoofing is a special case of integrity 
attacks whereby a compromised node impersonates a legitimate one due to the lack of 
authentication in the current ad hoc routing protocols [10, 19, 21].  
 
The main result of a spoofing attack is the misrepresentation of the network topology 
that may cause network loops or partitioning. Lack of integrity and authentication in 
routing protocols creates fabrication attacks [15] that result in erroneous and bogus 
routing messages.  
 
DoS is another type of attack, in which the attacker injects a large amount of junk 
packets into the network. These packets consume a significant portion of network 
resources and introduce wireless channel contention and network contention in ad hoc 
networks [4, 5, 24]. 
 
The described attacks identify critical security threats in ad hoc networks. The security 
challenges that arise in the main operations related to ad hoc networking are found in 
the data link and network layers. 
3 Security Challenges in the Data Link Layer 
The Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model (OSI Model or OSI Reference 
Model for short) is a layered abstract description for communications and computer 
network protocol design, developed as part of the Open Systems Interconnect initiative. 
The data link layer is second level of the seven-level OSI model and is the layer of the 
model which ensures that data is transferred correctly between adjacent network nodes. 
The data link layer provides the functional and procedural means to transfer data 
between network entities and to detect and possibly correct errors that may occur in the 
physical layer [17]. However, the main link layer operations related to ad hoc 
networking are one hop connectivity and frame transmission [18]. Data link layer 
protocols maintain connectivity between neighbouring nodes and ensure the correctness 
of frames transferred.  
 
It is essential to distinguish the relevance of security mechanisms implemented in the 
data link layer with respect to the requirements of MANET. In the case of mobile ad 
hoc networks, there are trusted and non-trusted environments [1, 4, 5, 14, 24]. In a 
trusted environment the nodes of the ad hoc network are controlled by a third party and 
can thus be trusted based on authentication. Data link layer security is justified in this 
case by the need to establish a trusted infrastructure based on logical security means. If 
the integrity of higher layer functions implemented by the trusted nodes can be assured, 
then data link layer security can even meet the security requirements raised by higher 
layers including routing and application protocols.  
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In non-trusted environments, on the other hand, trust in higher layers like routing or 
application protocols cannot be based on data link layer security mechanisms. The only 
relevant use of the latter appears to be node-to-node authentication and data integrity as 
required by the routing layer. Moreover, the main constraint in the deployment of 
existing data link layer security solutions (i.e. 802.11 and Bluetooth) is the lack of 
support for automated key management which is mandatory in open environments 
where manual key installation is not suitable. 
 
The main requirement for data link layer security mechanisms is the need to cope with 
the lack of physical security on the wireless segments of the communication 
infrastructure. The data link layer can be understood as a means of building a ‘wired 
equivalent’ security as described by the objectives of WEP of 802.11. Data link layer 
mechanisms like the ones provided by 802.11 and Bluetooth basically serve for access 
control and privacy enhancements to cope with the vulnerabilities of radio 
communication links. However, data link security performed at each hop cannot meet 
the end-to-end security requirements of applications neither on wireless links protected 
by IEEE 802.11 or Bluetooth nor on physically protected wired links.  
 
Recent research efforts have identified vulnerabilities in WEP and several types of 
cryptographic attacks exist due to misuse of the cryptographic primitives [16]. The 
IEEE 802.11 protocol is also weak to DoS attacks where the adversary may exploit its 
binary exponential back-off scheme to deny access to the wireless channel from its local 
neighbours. In addition, a continuously transmitting node can always capture the 
channel and cause other nodes to back off endlessly thus triggering a chain reaction 
from upper layer protocols (e.g. TCP window management) [2, 16]. 
 
Another DoS attack is also applicable in IEEE 802.11 with the use of the NAV field, 
which indicates the channel reservation, carried in the request to send/clear RTS/CTS 
frames. The adversary may overhear the NAV information and then intentionally 
introduce a 1-bit error into the victim’s link layer frame by wireless interference [2, 16]. 
 
Link layer security protocols should provide peer-to-peer security between directly 
connected nodes and secure frame transmissions by automating critical security 
operations including node authentication, frame encryption, data integrity verification 
and node availability. 
 
4 Security Challenges in Network layer 
The network layer is the third level of the seven level OSI model. The network layer 
addresses messages and translates logical addresses and names into physical addresses. 
It also determines the route from the source to the destination computer and manages 
traffic problems, such as switching, routing, and controlling the congestion of data 
packets [17].  
The main network operations related to ad hoc networking are routing and data packet 
forwarding [3, 8]. The routing protocols exchange routing data between nodes and 
maintain routing states at each node accordingly. Based on the routing states, data 
packets are forwarded by intermediate nodes along an established route to the 
destination.  
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In attacking routing protocols, the attackers can extract traffic towards certain 
destinations in compromised nodes and forward packets along a route that is not 
optimal. The adversaries can also create routing loops in the network and introduce 
network congestion and channel contention in certain areas. There are still many active 
research efforts in identifying and defending more sophisticated routing attacks [25, 26, 
27, 28]. 
 
In addition to routing attacks, the adversary may launch attacks against packet 
forwarding operations. Such attacks cause the data packets to be delivered in a way that 
is inconsistent with the routing states. For example, the attacker along an established 
route may drop the packets, modify the content of the packets, or duplicate the packets 
it has already forwarded [14]. DoS is another type of attack that targets packet-
forwarding protocols and introduces wireless channel contention and network 
contention in ad hoc networks [4, 5, 24]. 
 
Routing protocols can be divided into proactive, reactive and hybrid protocols 
depending on the routing topology [21]. Proactive protocols are either table-driven or 
distance-vector protocols. In such protocols, the nodes periodically refresh the existing 
routing information so every node can immediately operate with consistent and up-to-
date routing tables [21]. 
 
On the contrast, reactive or source-initiated on demand protocols do not periodically 
update the routing information [10]. Thus, they create a large overhead when the route 
is being determined, since the routes are not necessarily up-to-date when required. 
Hybrid protocols make use of both reactive and proactive approaches. They typically 
offer the means to switch dynamically between the reactive and proactive modes of the 
protocol [10]. 
 
Current efforts towards the design of secure routing protocols are mainly focused on 
reactive routing protocols, such as dynamic source routing (DSR) or ad-hoc on-demand 
distance vector (AODV) [6, 22], that have been demonstrated to perform better with 
significantly lower overheads than the proactive ones since they are able to react 
quickly to topology changes while keeping the routing overhead low in periods or areas 
of the network in which changes are less frequent. Some of these techniques are briefly 
described in the next paragraphs.  
  
Secure routing protocols currently proposed in the literature take into consideration 
active attacks performed by compromised nodes that aim at tampering with the 
execution of routing protocols whereas passive attacks and the selfishness problems are 
not addressed. For example, the secure routing protocol (SRP) [3, 8], which is a reactive 
protocol, guarantees the acquisition of correct topological information. It uses a hybrid 
key distribution based on the public keys of the communicating parties. It suffers, 
however, from the lack of a validation mechanism for route maintenance messages [14, 
23].    
 
Another reactive secure ad hoc routing protocol ARIADNE, which is based on DSR, 
guarantees point-to-point authentication by using a message authentication code (MAC) 
and a shared secret between the two parties [8, 26]. The ARAN secure routing protocol 
[8] detects and protects against malicious actions carried out by third parties and peers 
in the ad hoc environment. It protects against exploits using modification, fabrication 
and impersonation but the use of asymmetric cryptography makes it a very costly 
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protocol in terms of CPU usage and power consumption. The wormhole attack is 
surpassed with the use of another protocol [8]. 
 
SEAD, on the other hand, is a proactive protocol based on the destination sequenced 
distance vector protocol (DSDV) [28] that deals with attackers who modify routing 
information. It makes use of efficient one-way hash functions rather than relying on 
expensive asymmetric cryptography operations. SEAD does not cope with the 
wormhole attack and the authors propose, as in the ARIADNE protocol, to use a 
different protocol to detect this particular threat [8, 28].     
 
5 Layered Security Design 
The existing proposals in ad hoc networks are typically attack-oriented since they first 
identify several security threats and then enhance the existing protocol or propose a new 
protocol to challenge such threats. Because the solutions are designed explicitly with 
certain attack models in mind, they work well in the presence of designated attacks but 
may collapse under newly attacks.  
 
When the security of a given network architecture is not properly designed from the 
beginning, then the above mentioned security goals are difficult to achieve during 
network deployment. It is essential, therefore, to design secure ad hoc networks that will 
result in multiple lines of defence against both known and unknown security threats. 
This design is what we call layered security design.  
 
In the layered security design, we take into consideration not only malicious attacks but 
also other network faults due to misconfiguration, extreme network overload, or 
operational failures. All such faults, whether caused by attacks or by misconfiguration, 
share some symptoms from both the network and end-user perspectives, and should be 
handled by the security mechanisms. In addition, the overall system has to be robust and 
it should not be affected against the breakdown of any individual line of defence.  
 
Network Layer Operations 
 
Routing /  
Data Packet Forwarding 
Post-secure (Prevention / Reaction) 
Node-to-Node Authentication & Key Agreement 
Data Integrity, Confidentiality 
Non-repudiation of data 
 
Network Security 
Mechanisms 
Link Layer Operations 
 
One-hop Connectivity /  
Frame Transmission 
Pre-secure (Detection) 
Node-to-Node Authentication & Key Agreement 
Frame Integrity, Confidentiality 
Node Availability 
 
Link Security 
Mechanisms  
 
Table 1 - Layered Security 
 
As mentioned in section 3 and also shown in Table 1, link layer operations involve one-
hop connectivity and frame transmission, whereas network layer operations include 
routing and data packet forwarding. These operations comprise of link security and 
network security mechanisms that integrate a protocol securization process (Figure 2) 
which consists of pre-secure and post-secure sessions. The pre-secure session attempts 
to detect security threats through various cryptographic techniques, whereas the post-
secure session seeks to prevent such threats and react accordingly.  
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One-hop
Connectivity
&
Frame
Transmission
Node-to-Node
Authentication
&
Key Agreement
Data Integrity,
Confidentiality
Node Availability
Detection
Pre-secure Session
Post-secure Session
Routing
&
Packet
Forwarding
Node-to-Node
Authentication
&
Key Agreement
Data Integrity,
Confidentiality,
Non-repudiation
Prevention / Reaction
 
 
Figure 2 – Protocol Securization Process 
 
The layered security mechanisms should include prevention, detection and reaction 
operations to prevent intruders from entering the network. They should discover the 
intrusions and take actions to prevent persistent adverse effects. The prevention process 
can be embedded in secure routing and packet forwarding protocols to prevent the 
attacker from installing incorrect routing states at nodes.  
 
The detection process exploits ongoing attacks through identification of abnormal 
behaviour by malicious or selfish nodes. Such misbehaviour can be detected in the pre-
secure session either by node-to-node authentication or by node availability mechanisms 
as illustrated in Figure 3. Once the attacker is detected, reaction operations reconfigure 
routing and packet forwarding operations. The adjustments can range from avoiding this 
particular node in route selection to expelling the node from the network.  
 
Node-to-Node Authentication
& Key Agreement
Node Availability
Detection
Pre-Secure Session
Post-Secure Session
Prevention
Reaction
Node-to-Node Authentication
& Key Agreement
 
Figure 3 – Interaction of Prevention-Detection-Reaction Mechanisms 
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5.1 .  Pre-secure Session 
The layered security design adapts cryptographic methods to offer multiple protection 
lines to communicating nodes. When one or more nodes are connected to a MANET, 
the first phase of node-to-node authentication and key agreement procedure takes place. 
At this early stage, it is necessary to be able to determine the true identity of the nodes 
which could possibly gain access to a secret key later on. Let us consider the MANET 
of Figure 4 with the authenticated nodes A, B, and C. 
 
C
A
B
X1
Authentication
& Key Agreement
Authentication &
Key Agreement
C
A
B
X1
Authentication
& Key Agreement
Authentication &
Key Agreement
X2
Authentication
& Key Agreement
Authentication &
Key Agreement
 
(a)                                                                                               (b) 
 
Figure 4 – New Nodes in MANET 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4 (a), when node X1 enters the MANET, it will be authenticated 
by both nodes that will exchange routing information later on in the post-secure session 
(i.e. B and C). When two nodes e.g. nodes X1 and X2 enter the MANET simultaneously, 
they will both be authenticated by valid nodes. Even though we refer to nodes entering 
simultaneously there will always be a small time difference in their entrance to the 
network. Therefore, node X1 will enter slightly before node X2. In this case node X1 gets 
authenticated first by nodes B and C, making node X1 a valid node and upon entrance of 
node X2, nodes B and X1 will authenticate node X2. Once nodes X1 and X2 have been 
authenticated by valid nodes, they will also authenticate each other since routing and 
packet forwarding data will be sent to or received by them. 
 
There are several authentication and key agreement protocols available in the literature 
that can be applied to MANETs. However, it is necessary to use non-interactive and low 
complexity protocols that will not create extra computational overhead in the network. 
For example, a provably secure authentication and key agreement scheme can be 
considered as a “good” candidate at the pre-secure session. Such a scheme is preferable 
to a computationally secure authentication and key agreement scheme because its 
security relies on the apparent intractability of a well known computational problem (i.e. 
discrete logarithm problem) and does not necessarily require the use of a symmetric or 
an asymmetric encryption algorithm. Therefore, authentication and key agreement can 
be achieved with a zero knowledge protocol, similar to the protocol described in [17] 
that provides such characteristics.    
 
The basic concept behind the use of such cryptographic protocols is that they allow a 
claimant, a node in a MANET context, to demonstrate knowledge of a secret while 
revealing no information whatsoever of use to the verifying node even if the claimant 
node misbehaves. In such protocols, nodes must exchange multiple messages, also 
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referred to as interactive, where the proof is probabilistic rather than absolute. However, 
interactive zero protocols are not suitable for wireless environments since they 
exchange multiple messages and result in the reduction of network performance. 
MANETs are suitable for non-interactive zero knowledge protocols where nodes do not 
need to exchange multiple messages to prove their identity.  
 
In Figure 4 (a) for example, node X1 can prove its identity to nodes B and C ensuring 
that specific discrete logarithms (i.e. y1=β1x1 and y2=β1x2 to the bases β1 and β2) satisfy a 
linear equation (i.e. λ1x1 + λ2x2 = b (mod q) for integers λ1 and λ2) [17]. In this example, 
node X1 sends to nodes B and C some logarithms. Nodes B and C respond with the 
parameters of the logarithms and finally node X1 responds with a resulting proof that 
satisfies a known linear equation. Following the same procedure, nodes B and C can 
prove their identity to node X1.  
 
The node-to-node authentication and key agreement procedure found in the pre-secure 
phase can detect whether an authenticated node has been compromised. This can be 
done when a random secret number has been injected and shared between the nodes. 
The range of the exchanged random secret can be checked by the node. This will 
probably enable or disable traffic to be forwarded to nodes that fail to authenticate.  
 
The random secret can take part in the generation of the encryption key that takes place 
at the post-secure session. Such random information can also be used to determine node 
availability. When the authentication and key agreement phases have been completed, 
frames can be encrypted and data integrity can be achieved using state-of-the-art 
existing cryptographic algorithms. 
 
5.2 .  Post-secure Session 
When routing information is ready to be transferred, the second phase of the 
authentication and key agreement process takes place. Authentication carries on in the 
available nodes starting one-hop at a time from the source to destination route. While 
nodes in the source to destination path are authenticated, they also agree on an 
encryption key, also referred to as session key, which will be used to encrypt their 
traffic. Similar to the pre-secure session, data confidentiality and integrity can be 
achieved using well-known cryptographic algorithms. Moreover, non-repudiation can 
be attained with cryptographic techniques, such as digital signatures, message 
authentication codes (MAC) and hash functions.   
 
In this second phase of the authentication and key agreement, strong authentication is 
necessary since the actual data are ready to be sent. Challenge-response protocols can be 
applied to identify users through verification of their knowledge of a shared secret. Such 
protocols are based on symmetric and/or asymmetric key techniques. When symmetric 
schemes are applied, the nodes share a symmetric key k and mutual authentication 
between nodes B and X1 (see Figure 4a) can be achieved in the following way: 
 
B ← X1 : r1   (1) 
B → X1 : Ek(r1, r2, B)  (2) 
B ← X1 : Ek(r2, r1)  (3) 
 
where E is a symmetric encryption algorithm and r1, r2 are random numbers.   
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Node X1 generates a random number and sends it to node B.  Upon reception of (1), 
node B encrypts the two random numbers and its identity and sends message (2) to node 
X1.  Then, node X1 checks for its random number, constructs (3) and sends it to node B.  
Upon reception of (3), node B checks that both random numbers match these ones used 
earlier.  The encryption algorithm in the above mechanism may be replaced by MAC, 
which is efficient and affordable for low-end devices, such as sensor nodes. However, 
MAC can be verified only by the intended receiving node, making it ineligible for 
broadcast message authentication.  
 
When asymmetric key techniques are applied, nodes own a key pair and mutual 
authentication between nodes X1 and C (Figure 4a) can be achieved in the following 
way: 
 
X1 → C : PC(r1, A)  (1) 
X1 ← C : PX1(r1, r2)  (2) 
X1 → C : r2   (3) 
 
where P is a public key encryption algorithm and r1, r2 are random numbers.   
 
Nodes A and B exchange random numbers in messages (1) and (2) that are encrypted 
with their public keys. Upon decrypting messages (1) and (2), nodes B and A achieve 
mutual authentication by checking that the random numbers recovered agree with the 
ones sent in messages (3) and (2) respectively. Note that the public key encryption 
algorithm can be replaced by digital signatures.  
 
Digital signatures though involve much more computational overhead in signing, 
decrypting, verifying and encrypting operations. They are also less resilient against DoS 
attacks since an attacker may launch a large number of bogus signatures to exhaust the 
victim’s computational resources for verifying them. Each node also needs to keep a 
certificate revocation list or revoked certificates and public keys of valid nodes. 
 
In many cases, routing messages are typically propagated through multiple paths and 
redundant copies of such messages can be used by compromised nodes. The 
authentication and key agreement procedure found in the post-secure phase can prevent 
and react to compromised nodes. This can occur by using the random information that 
has been injected and agreed upon at the pre-secure session.  
 
The above mentioned layered security solution poses grand yet exciting research 
challenges. The structuring process steps of layered security design (Figure 2) can be 
expanded into a “process framework”, as illustrated in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5 – Process Framework for Layered Security Design 
 
A node has to properly select security mechanisms that fit well into its own available 
resources, deployment cost and other complex constraints. It expects best effort from 
each component.  It is necessary to identify the systems principles of how to build such 
link and network security mechanisms that will explore their methods and learn to 
prevent, detect and react to threats accordingly.  
 
For example, if it is our intention to build security mechanisms at the data link layer 
then it can be seen in Figure 5 that the authentication and key agreement mechanism can 
be based on symmetric, asymmetric and/or hybrid techniques to identify nodes. The 
identification procedure can apply zero knowledge schemes. Such authentication 
mechanism should also integrate detection methods. The data confidentiality, integrity 
and node availability mechanisms can be based on symmetric, asymmetric or hybrid 
techniques.   
 
Likewise, the security mechanisms at the network layer consist of an authentication and 
key agreement mechanism that will be based on symmetric, asymmetric and/or hybrid 
techniques to identify nodes; an identification procedure that follows challenge-
response schemes and integrates prevention and reaction methods; and data 
confidentiality integrity, and node availability mechanisms that can apply symmetric, 
asymmetric or hybrid techniques.  
 
 
-12-
Evaluating the layered security design also offers new research opportunities. The 
effectiveness of each security operation and the minimal number of fences the system 
has to build to ensure a certain degree of security assurance should be evaluated through 
a combination of analysis, simulations, and measurements. 
 
6 Conclusions 
Security is an issue that it is more sensitive in MANET than in other networks, due to 
the open nature and lack of infrastructure of ad hoc networks. Current research efforts 
on ad hoc networks follow a hierarchical approach, where the most explored area 
involves secure routing protocols. Authentication and key management mechanisms, on 
the other side, are explored less than routing protocols. Moreover, the least explored 
research area relates to link security protocols. 
 
Since mobile ad hoc networks can be formed, merged together or partitioned into 
separate networks on the fly, the need for more sophisticated security measures arises. 
Therefore, security requirements, such as authenticity, confidentiality, integrity and 
non-repudiation should focus on both link and network layers. In this article, we 
explored the security requirements in a layered approach, in which prevention, detection 
and reaction mechanisms should be available. Integrating cryptographic mechanisms in 
the pre-secure and post-secure sessions will help to create multiple lines of defence and 
further protect ad hoc networks from malicious attackers. 
 
Designing such cryptographic mechanisms, which are efficient in terms of both 
computational and message overhead, is the main research objective in the area of 
authentication and key management for ad hoc networks. In wireless sensing for 
instance, designing efficient cryptographic mechanisms for authentication and key 
management in broadcast and multicast scenarios poses a great challenge.  
 
Once the authentication and key management infrastructure is in place, data 
confidentiality and integrity issues can be tackled by using existing and efficient 
symmetric algorithms since there is no need to develop any special integrity and 
encryption algorithms for ad hoc networks.    
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